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Abstract
We consider a system where an agent (Alice) aims at transmitting a message to a second agent
(Bob) over a set of parallel channels, while keeping it secret from a third agent (Eve) by using physical
layer security techniques. We assume that Alice perfectly knows the set of channels with respect to
Bob, but she has only a statistical knowledge of the channels with respect to Eve. We derive bounds
on the achievable outage secrecy rates, by considering coding either within each channel or across all
parallel channels. Transmit power is adapted to the channel conditions, with a constraint on the average
power over the whole transmission. We also focus on the maximum cumulative outage secrecy rate that
can be achieved. Moreover, in order to assess the performance in a real life scenario, we consider the
use of practical error correcting codes. We extend the definitions of security gap and equivocation rate,
previously applied to the single additive white Gaussian noise channel, to Rayleigh distributed parallel
channels, on the basis of the error rate targets and the outage probability. Bounds on these metrics are
also derived, taking into account the statistics of the parallel channels. Numerical results are provided,
that confirm the feasibility of the considered physical layer security techniques.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Performance of physical layer security schemes can be assessed either by evaluating their
achievable secrecy rates – which assume, among other things, ideal coding (e.g., Gaussian
codewords with infinite length) – or focusing on practical codes and considering the error
probabilities for both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
Within the former approach, the ergodic secrecy capacity for a fast fading scenario is derived
in [1] by maximizing the ergodic secrecy rate over all power allocations that meet an average
transmit power constraint. A compound parallel Gaussian wiretap channel, in which the main
channel gains are known to all parties, while the eavesdropper gains can take any value within
a given finite set, is considered in [2], where a max-min coding strategy is proved to achieve
secrecy capacity. In the block fading scenario of [3], only statistics of both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper channels are assumed to be known at the transmitter. Then, a secrecy
throughput is evaluated, that is achieved either with repetition coding or with a single wiretap
channel code over a finite number of fading blocks. On the other hand, it is necessary to take
into account the probability that, for a certain fraction of time, the transmission becomes either
unreliable (reliability outage) or insecure (secrecy outage). The statistical distribution of the
secrecy capacity and the low-rate limit on the secrecy outage probability are derived in [4], [5]
for a set of independently faded parallel wiretap channels, thus modeling orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM) transmissions. In [6], perfect channel state information (CSI) for
the main channel and statistical CSI for the eavesdropper channel are assumed: for a fast Rayleigh
fading wiretap channel with a multi-antenna transmitter and a single antenna device for both the
intended receiver and the eavesdropper (MISOSE channel), the ergodic secrecy rate is optimized
through an artificial noise injection scheme. Similarly, [7] fully characterizes the ergodic secrecy
capacity of the MISOSE channel under statistical CSI for both the main and the eavesdropper
channels.
Very few examples of practical codes over (different kinds of) wiretap channels have been
studied in previous literature. Most of these papers aim at finding codes able to achieve the
October 28, 2014 DRAFT
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 1, NO. 1, JANUARY 2025 3
secrecy capacity. This problem has been solved for the binary erasure channel (BEC), where
low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes have been considered [8], and for the binary symmetric
channel (BSC), where polar codes have been proposed [9]. More recently, polar codes have
also been included in a key agreement protocol over block fading channels [10]. Polar coding,
however, has been shown to be optimal over discrete memoryless channels, while our focus is
on continuous-output channel models, which are best suited to model wireless transmissions.
To the best of the authors knowledge, at this time no code is available that ensures information
theoretic secrecy, even asymptotically (e.g., in one of the criteria listed in [11]) over continuous
output channels; therefore, other secrecy metrics must be considered. A first step toward practical
scenarios is provided by the equivocation rate [12], that still considers information leakage as
a security metric, while taking into account the rate that can be reliably decoded by Bob with
practical codes. However, it is still assumed that Eve may get an information rate equal to her
channel capacity. When this assumption is removed and the error rate that can be achieved even
by Eve is taken into account, an interesting metric is the security gap [13], that compares the
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) on the main and the eavesdropper channels required to achieve both
a sufficient level of secrecy and reliable decoding by the authorized receiver. In other words, the
security gap is the required legitimate receiver power margin for having both a sufficiently high
probability that he correctly receives the transmitted message and a sufficiently high probability
that the message is not gathered by an eavesdropper. The security gap metric has been applied
in [14] to punctured LDPC codes and in [15]–[17] to non-systematic codes, including LDPC
codes and classical Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes. Practical codes for physical
layer security have also been applied over the packet erasure channel [18], where some properties
of stopping sets are exploited to achieve secrecy with punctured non-systematic LDPC codes.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the evaluation of secrecy capabilities, with the security
gap metric, for practical codes over parallel channels has never been faced in previous literature.
In this paper, we consider a parallel channels scenario where a transmitter, Alice, and a
legitimate receiver, Bob, have perfect CSI for their link, while Alice only has a statistical
description of the link between herself and the eavesdropper, Eve. Both the Alice-Bob and the
Alice-Eve links are assumed to be independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh parallel
channels, modeling for example an OFDM transmission over independently faded subcarriers.
As the channel gains are represented by continuous random variables, the compound parallel
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Gaussian wiretap channel model [2] does not apply. Moreover, transmission is performed over
a finite set of parallel channels, thus preventing the leverage of ergodicity for the fading wiretap
channel [1]. Therefore, the transmission scenario implies a nonzero secrecy outage probability
[19], and we aim at maximizing the secrecy rates while satisfying a constraint on the secrecy
outage probability.
Two approaches are considered for the transmission of a message by Alice: in one case, the
message is first split into sub-messages, each separately encoded and transmitted on a different
channel; in the other case, the message is encoded into a single codeword which is split into
sub-words, each transmitted on a different channel. The first case is denoted as coding per
sub-message (CPS), while the second one is denoted as coding across sub-messages (CAS).
This distinction is similar to the one between variable and constant rate transmission in [1].
However, in [1] codewords are assumed to span all the possible fading states, thus reducing it to
an ergodic scenario. Here instead we consider a finite set of parallel channels, thus taking into
account the possibility of secrecy outage. The performance of the proposed scheme is assessed
both by information theoretical arguments and by evaluation of the error rates with existing
practical codes.
The main contributions of the paper are:
• the derivation of achievable secrecy rates for transmissions over independent Rayleigh
distributed parallel channels subject to a secrecy outage probability constraint;
• the joint optimization of power and rate allocation among sub-messages for secrecy rate
maximization subject to a constraint on the maximum secrecy outage probability, where the
compound parallel Gaussian wiretap channel model [2] cannot be applied;
• the derivation of closed-form expressions of the outage secrecy rates for both CPS and CAS
scenarios, otherwise previously available only by Monte Carlo methods [3];
• the non-trivial performance comparison between CPS and CAS, since their outage secrecy
rates are not immediately comparable;
• the derivation of bounds on the error rates for Bob and Eve with practical codes on Rayleigh
distributed parallel channels;
• the extension of the security gap and the equivocation rate metrics from a single additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel to Rayleigh distributed parallel channels.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the system model, and in Section
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III we derive theoretical bounds on the achievable rates, for both CPS and CAS. In Section IV we
use the error rate as a different metric to assess the physical layer security on parallel channels,
when practical codes are applied. Section V provides several numerical examples, and Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us consider a scenario with K parallel wiretap channels with independent Rayleigh
distributed fading and AWGN. We denote by hk the complex (baseband equivalent) channel
coefficient between Alice and Bob upon transmission over the channel k = 1, 2, . . . , K, and gk
the corresponding channel coefficient between Alice and Eve. Both coefficients are assumed to
be constant for the duration of a transmission. The power gains Hk = |hk|2, and Gk = |gk|2
are independent exponentially distributed random variables with means αB and αE, respectively.
The thermal noise variance of all channels is normalized to one. Let us define the vectors
H = [H1, . . . , HK ] and P = [P1, . . . , PK], where Pk is the power transmitted by Alice over the
k-th channel.
In the following, we will refer to the notion of secrecy rate, that is a transmission rate for
which, in the asymptotic regime of infinite codeword length, it is possible to guarantee that
the error probability at Bob’s receiver approaches zero (reliability condition) and that mutual
information between the transmitted message and the signal received by Eve is arbitrarily small
(strong secrecy condition, as formally defined in, e.g., [20, Sec. 3.3]). Secrecy and reliability can
be ensured if Alice has CSI on channels to both Bob and Eve. However, as better explained in the
following, Alice is assumed to know only the statistical description of the channel coefficients
gk. In this case, using a code with a given secrecy rate may lead to some information leakage
to Eve (depending on channel conditions), i.e., to a secrecy outage [19] event.
As stated in Section I, two coding approaches are considered:
Coding per sub-message (CPS): In this case, Alice first splits the message into K sub-
messages; each of them is then encoded into a different codeword and transmitted over a different
channel, as shown in Fig. 1. The secrecy rate for sub-message k = 1, 2, . . . , K is Rk. In other
terms, each sub-message is encoded independently using a wiretap channel code with secrecy
rate Rk, where
∑K
k=1Rk is the total message rate.
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Fig. 1. System model for CPS. S/P: serial to parallel; P/S: parallel to serial.
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Fig. 2. System model for CAS.
Coding across sub-messages (CAS): In this case, the message is first encoded into a single
codeword and then transmitted over the K parallel channels, as shown in Fig. 2. The secrecy
rate of the message is denoted as R.
In this paper we investigate the two schemes when a transmission spans a finite set of channel
realizations and Alice does not have CSI of the channel to Eve. Then, secrecy conditions may be
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not satisfied and the outage probability is considered as a performance metric together with the
secrecy rate. We will see that also in this scenario the performance of the two schemes differ.
We first observe that CPS is a special case of CAS, where a specific encoding procedure
(splitting data and encoding them separately) is enforced. In this respect, we expect CAS to
outperform CPS. On the other hand, when full CSI on both the main and eavesdropper channel
is available at the transmitter, the two schemes achieve the same performance [21], [22]. Then,
it is interesting to see the performance gap when Alice has full CSI on the channel to Bob,
and only partial CSI on the channel to Eve. Moreover, when a finite message of fixed size is
considered, the code length in CAS is larger than in CPS, thus providing an advantage for CAS.
On the other hand, choosing a CPS scheme yields a parallel implementation of encoding and
decoding, allowing the use of solutions devised for AWGN channels. Because of the advantages
and limits of each scheme, it is difficult to establish the superiority of one solution over the
other in absolute terms.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE BOUNDS WITH IDEAL CODES
We suppose that Alice knows the channel with respect to Bob before transmission, while
the Alice-Eve channel is known only in statistical terms1. This is a very realistic assumption,
since in most of the practical cases Alice does not know the eavesdropper precise location. On
the other hand, the Alice-Bob channel state can be learned by conventional channel estimation
techniques. Note that we assume that each channel is constant for the whole duration of the
transmission, thus allowing for its estimation. A relevant practical example is OFDM, where the
assumption of i.i.d. gains over the parallel channels can be met by considering ideal interleaving
across sub-carriers separated by significantly more than the channel coherence bandwidth [23,
p. 101].
Due to partial CSI by Alice on her channel to Eve and to the fact that a finite number K
of fading states are spanned by each transmission, we cannot ensure strong secrecy. Instead,
we impose that the probability that Eve gets non vanishing information on the secret message
(strong secrecy outage probability) is below a given threshold ε.
1In Appendix C we consider the case where also the Alice-Bob channel is known only statistically.
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In this section we focus on ideal codes, i.e., codes with infinite code length and Gaussian
codewords. We aim at allocating power over the channels for the two coding schemes in order
to maximize the secrecy rate while ensuring the target outage probability.
Constrained Secrecy Rate Maximization Problem for CPS: Let us define the vector of
secrecy rates R = [R1, . . . , RK ] and let
ps(P ,R;H) =
P
[∪Kk=1{log(1 +HkPk)− log(1 +GkPk) ≤ Rk}] (1)
be the secrecy outage probability, i.e., the probability that any of the K channels is in secrecy
outage. In (1), log(·) denotes the base-2 logarithm and P [·] the probability operator, in this case
with respect to the random variable Gk, while Hk is known. The following constraints must be
satisfied on R and P
ps(P ,R;H) ≤ ε , (2a)
1
K
K∑
k=1
Pk ≤ Pmax , (2b)
Pk ≥ 0 , k = 1, 2, . . . , K , (2c)
Rk ≥ 0 , k = 1, 2, . . . , K . (2d)
Constraint (2a) sets the maximum allowed secrecy outage probability to ε; constraint (2b) imposes
a bound on the average transmit power to Pmax, while (2c) and (2d) ensure that the resulting
powers and rates are non-negative. Now, we aim at finding the maximum average outage secrecy
rate [19] that can be achieved, as the solution of the following problem
max
{Pk,Rk}
K∑
k=1
Rk , (3)
subject to (2).
Constrained Secrecy Rate Maximization Problem for CAS: For CAS, coding is performed by
Alice across the K sub-messages. For a given realization of Bob’s channel values (H1, . . . , HK),
the secrecy outage probability with respect to the random (and unknown to Alice) gains in Eve’s
channel can be written as [1]
ps(P , R;H) =
P
[
K∑
k=1
log(1 +HkPk)−
K∑
k=1
log(1 +GkPk) ≤ R
]
.
(4)
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Constraint (2a) becomes
ps(P , R;H) ≤ ε , (5a)
and (2d) becomes
R ≥ 0 , (5b)
while the other constraints remain unchanged. The maximization problem becomes
max
{Pk,R}
R , (6)
subject to (2b)-(2c) and (5).
Note that the constrained maximization problems differ from the conventional bit and power
loading for insecure transmission due to the presence of the security constraint. Therefore, the
waterfilling solution is not optimal in this case, as will be confirmed by numerical results in
Section V.
A. Coding Per Sub-Message
With CPS each sub-message is encoded independently of the others, with a target secrecy rate
Rk. Secrecy outage is experienced when at least one of the K sub-messages transmitted over
the different channels is in outage. Therefore, the secrecy outage probability in (1) is given by
ps(P ,R;H) = 1−
K∏
k=1
(1− pk), (7)
where pk is the secrecy outage probability for sub-message k, given that the corresponding
realization of Hk is known, i.e.,
pk = P [log(1 +HkPk)− log(1 +GkPk) ≤ Rk]
=
1, Rk > log(1 +HkPk)1− FG (1+HkPkPk2Rk − 1Pk) , otherwise,
(8)
where FG(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the eavesdropper power gain
Gk over the k-th channel, which is the same for all channels.
If for some k we have Rk > log(1 + HkPk), then the CPS system is always in outage.
Otherwise, by the assumption of i.i.d. Rayleigh channel gains, with simple algebra we obtain
ps(P ,R;H) = 1−
K∏
k=1
{
1− exp
[
− 1
αE
(
1 +HkPk
Pk2Rk
− 1
Pk
)]}
.
(9)
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Note that the secrecy outage probability for each sub-message k is a function of both the power
Pk and the target secrecy rate Rk. Therefore, the rate maximization problem (3) cannot be
formulated as a special instance of the compound parallel Gaussian wiretap channel [2], since
the allocation of the target secrecy rates Rk adds K variables to the rate maximization problem.
In fact, constraint (2a) can be met by different rate K-tuples. The secrecy rates Rk are related to
the transmit power. In particular, if we restrict the constraints (2c)–(2d) to hold without equality,
i.e.,
Pk > 0 , Rk > 0 (10)
and denote by p¯k the target secrecy outage probability for each sub-message, i.e.,
exp
[
− 1
αE
(
1 +HkPk
Pk2Rk
− 1
Pk
)]
= p¯k , (11)
we obtain the following result.
Theorem 1: For a given K-tuple of outage probabilities p¯ = (p¯1, . . . , p¯K) and ν > 0, let us
define u¯k = −αE ln p¯k. If ν −Hk + u¯k < 0, ∀k, then the power allocation
Pk =P
⋆
k =
−ν(u¯k +Hk)
2u¯kνHk
+√
[ν(u¯k +Hk)]
2 − 4u¯kνHk(ν −Hk + u¯k)
2u¯kνHk
(12)
maximizes the sum-rate (3) under the constraint (10).
Therefore, if ν is such that (2b) is satisfied with equality, {P ⋆k } is also the power allocation
that solves the maximization problem (3), under constraints (2a), (2b) and (10), with secrecy
outage probability as in (9). The corresponding secrecy rate of the message is
Rs =
K∑
k=1
Rk =
K∑
k=1
log
1 +HkPk
u¯kPk + 1
. (13)
Proof: See Appendix A.
From Theorem 1 we conclude that the maximum secrecy rate ensuring a secrecy outage
probability not greater than ε is obtained by solving
max
p¯,ν
K∑
k=1
log
1 +HkPk
u¯kPk + 1
(14)
subject to 1−∏Kk=1(1− p¯k) ≤ ε, (12), (2b), and (10). The solution of these problems requires
numerical methods. Note however that Theorem 1 allows a strong reduction in the number of
unknowns: from 2K in the original problem formulation (3) to (K +1) in the formulation (14).
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B. Coding Across Sub-Messages
We start from (4), which reflects the specific encoding (and decoding) structure of CAS, and
in this respect it is different from (1), valid for CPS.
Let
Φ(P , R;H) = 2[
∑K
k=1 log(1+HkPk)−R] (15)
and let us define
ε(P ) =
K∏
k=1
e
1
PkαE , ϕ(P ) =
[
K∏
k=1
1
PkαE
]−1
. (16)
As derived in Appendix B, the secrecy outage probability (4) can be written as
ps(P , R;H) = 1− ε(P )
ϕ(P )
×{
Φ(P , R;H)G
(
Φ(P , R;H)
ϕ(P )
(
)− G
(
1
ϕ(P )
)}
,
(17)
where
G(a) =
HK,11,K+1
a
∣∣∣∣∣∣ {(0, 1, 0)}{{(0, 1, (PkαE)−1}k=1,...,K , (−1, 1, 0)}
 (18)
and H[·] is the generalized Fox H-function, whose definition is recalled in Appendix B.
Then (5a) can be rewritten as
0 ≤ R ≤ p−1s (P , ε;H) , (19)
where p−1s (P , ε;H) is the inverse of (17) with respect to R.
When the outage secrecy rate is maximized, R equals the right hand side (r.h.s.) in (19);
therefore, we can remove R from the optimization variables and the maximum outage secrecy
rate problem (6) can be rewritten as
max
P
p−1s (P , ε;H) , (20)
subject to (2b) and (2c). This problem cannot be solved in closed form and we must resort to
numerical methods. Examples will be given in Section V.
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IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE BOUNDS WITH PRACTICAL CODES
The analysis in Section III relies on the use of ideal codes, thus providing an upper bound
on the performance reachable by using practical forward error correcting (FEC) codes. Indeed,
when long codewords can be used, practical codes (e.g., LDPC codes) may well approximate
asymptotic performance achieving results close to capacity. In this context, the transmission rate
to Bob that can be obtained with the power allocation P corresponds to the code rate, while its
difference with the outage secrecy capacity provides the rate of the random message to be used
in random binning in order to obtain the target secrecy outage probability. However, when limits
on the length of the codeword are relevant, due to delay constraints or channel coherence time
concerns, other approaches should be considered in the code design. Hence, in order to better
assess the performance of finite length practical codes, we gradually introduce the characteristics
of a real transmission:
• Discrete (finite) constellations: when finite and discrete constellations are used, in
the secrecy capacity expression we should consider the constellation-constrained mutual
information.
• Deterministic encoding: when FEC is used without probabilistic encoding (e.g., random
binning) that is typical of wiretap codes, we focus on the amount of information per channel
use that remains unknown to Eve, with probability at least 1 − ε; we thus introduce the
ε-outage equivocation rate, extending the notion given in [12] for AWGN channels.
• Finite length codes: with finite length codes, both Bob and Eve are prone to errors and
secrecy cannot be assessed by Eve’s equivocation only. The metric that suitably summarizes
the error probabilities of the two agents is the security gap (used for the AWGN channel
in [14]–[17]), as will be defined in Section IV-B.
A. Finite Constellation and Deterministic Encoding
When a finite constellation is considered (still with wiretap coding), let C(γ) be the
mutual information rate of a Gaussian channel with a fixed (e.g., uniform) distribution as a
(monotonically increasing) function of the SNR γ. The expression of C(γ) depends on the
adopted input constellation.
In this case, for CPS, (8) becomes
pk = P [C(HkPk)− C(GkPk) ≤ Rk] , (21)
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thus providing for Rayleigh fading channels
ps(P ,R;H) = 1−
K∏
k=1
{
1− exp
(
−C
−1[C(HkPk)− Rk]
PkαE
)}
.
(22)
Similarly, for CAS, (4) becomes
ps(P , R;H) = P
[
K∑
k=1
[C(HkPk)− C(GkPk)] ≤ R
]
≤ 1−
K∏
k=1
{
1− exp
(
−C
−1[(
∑
k C(HkPk)− R)/K]
PkαE
)}
,
where the last upper bound is obtained by assuming Rayleigh fading channels and by observing
that
K∑
k=1
C(GkPk) ≤ Kmax
k
C(GkPk). (23)
The outage secrecy rate obtained under constellation constrained transmission is denoted as C(ε)s .
Consider now a deterministic encoding without wiretap coding features, with a fixed code
rate Rc. In [12] the level of confidentiality obtained in a coded transmission over an AWGN
channel is evaluated through its equivocation rate, that is, the difference between the code rate
and the information rate at the eavesdropper. The equivocation rate is an indicator of the residual
uncertainty of the eavesdropper on the transmitted message. We extend the notion of equivocation
rate to the considered scenario through an outage formulation, and derive lower bounds for both
CPS and CAS. The code rate Rc and allocated powers {Pk} are assumed to satisfy the reliability
conditions
Rc ≤ C(HkPk) ∀k for CPS, (24a)
Rc ≤ 1
K
K∑
k=1
C(HkPk) for CAS. (24b)
Since all information bits are intended for confidential transmission, now Rc plays the role of
mutual information between Alice and Bob. In particular, the secrecy outage probabilities have
the expressions (22) and (IV-A), where C(HkPk) is replaced by Rc. Correspondingly, the ε-
outage equivocation rate is the maximum value of
∑
k Rk or R such that the outage probability
constraint is satisfied.
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B. Finite Length Codes
When codes of finite length are considered, we cannot use the secrecy capacity or the
equivocation rate to assess their performance. Instead we have to take into account the non-
vanishing error probability incurred by these codes. Let us denote by pB and pE the decoding
error rate on the entire message received by Bob and Eve, respectively. Given two arbitrarily
small threshold values, ρ and η, the transmission can be considered reliable and secure if the
following two conditions are satisfied2 [14], [17]:
pB ≤ ρ , (25a)
pE ≥ 1− η . (25b)
The condition on pB for CPS can be translated into a condition on the codeword error rate
(CER) pBk on each sub-message k. We first observe that
pB = 1−
K∏
k=1
(1− pBk ) . (26)
Although in general the maximum secrecy outage rate is achieved with different values of pBk
for each channel, here we focus on the case of equal error probabilities for each channel, so that
(25a) becomes
pBk ≤ 1− K
√
1− ρ . (27)
For CAS, instead, the condition on pB directly translates into a condition on the CER, since pB
coincides with the CER in this case. Therefore, we can fix a threshold δ on the CER for the
two schemes as follows  pBk ≤ δ = 1− K
√
1− ρ , for CPS,
pB ≤ δ = ρ , for CAS.
(28)
2Note that condition (25b) refers to the decoding error probability. For messages that are not perfectly source-coded (i.e., are
not at maximum entropy), non-systematic codes must be used to increase secrecy [14], [17].
Note that, assuming that the secret message is uniformly distributed, perfect secrecy requires that (25b) is satisfied with
η = 2−NRs for any decoding strategy, where N is the codeword length. Such condition is also sufficient if it holds in particular
for the optimal strategy, that is maximum likelihood (ML) decoding. Similarly, for the rate Rs to be achievable under an
information theoretic secrecy criterion of variational distance (e.g., criterion (2) in [11]) it is necessary and sufficient that there
exists a sequence of codes with lengths N ∈ N, such that (25b) is satisfied under ML decoding for each N with η ∼ 2−NRs
as N →∞, while at the same time ρ→ 0 in (25a).
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On the contrary, we impose that the CER for Eve always equals or overcomes 1 − η. It is
important that this occurs even with CPS, on each channel, since otherwise Eve, though not
being able to decode the whole message, could successfully discover some part of it.
Note that condition (25a) can be met through a suitable power allocation, since Bob’s channels
are known. Condition (25b), instead, can only be met statistically, that is, by tolerating some
outage probability, since only a statistical description of Eve’s channels is available. The case
in which Bob’s channels are also known only in statistical terms is studied in Appendix C.
We indicate by γBδ the minimum SNR on each channel that ensures condition (28), that is
γBδ (k) = min
{
γ ∈ R : P [EBk |PkHk = γ] ≤ δ} (29)
where EBk denotes Bob’s decoding error event on channel k for CPS, and
γBδ =min {γ ∈ R :
P
[
EB|P1H1 = γ, . . . , PKHK = γ
] ≤ δ} (30)
with EB denoting Bob’s decoding error event for CAS. On the other hand, since we assume
that Alice does not know Eve’s channels, we consider an outage approach for the definition of
the security gap. In fact, pE is a random variable, whose distribution, under the i.i.d. Rayleigh
assumption, only depends on the average SNR of Eve’s channels, defined as
γ¯E =
1
K
∑
k
αEPk. (31)
We are interested in finding the maximum value of γ¯E, denoted by γ¯Emax, for which the
probability that pE < 1− η is not greater than ε. In fact, γ¯Emax represents the maximum average
SNR over Eve’s channel which is acceptable to meet (25b) under the outage constraint. We have
γ¯Emax =
1
K
∑
k
Pk max{αE : P
[
pE < 1− η] ≤ ε} . (32)
Aiming to extend the original definition of security gap given for the AWGN channel in [13] to
the considered scenario, we define the ε-outage security gap as
Sε =

∑K
k=1 γ
B
δ (k)
K γ¯Emax
for CPS,
γBδ
γ¯Emax
for CAS.
(33)
It has to be observed that the security gap defined by (33) is computed on the basis of the
codeword error rate, and does not depend on the bit error rate of the secret message. This
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allows us to define a target which does not depend on the secret message rate, and to study
the achievable equivocation rate. Then, some nested coding approach [24] should be used to
achieve a secret message rate that approaches the achievable equivocation rate. Nested codes
can also be obtained through the scrambling-based non-systematic encoding approach proposed
in [15]–[17], by using a code with length N and dimension Nd = RcN , and Ns ≤ Nd bits for
the secret message. The Nd −Ns remaining information bits are randomly generated, therefore
each secret message is randomly associated to 2Nd−Ns codewords. This, however, is out of the
scope of this paper.
In the following, we derive bounds on the ε-outage security gaps for CPS and CAS, and
discuss the optimization of the corresponding power allocations.
C. Computation of γ¯Emax and γBδ
The parameters required for the computation of the security gap (33) are now derived.
Computation of γ¯Emax for CPS: When coding is applied separately on each sub-message,
condition (25b) must hold on each channel.
The eavesdropper outage probability becomes
pE = 1−
K∏
k=1
(
1− P [pEk < 1− η])
= 1−
K∏
k=1
(1− P [PkGk > γEη (k)]) , (34)
where pEk is Eve’s CER on the k-th channel, and γEη (k) is the maximum SNR on the same
channel which ensures pEk ≥ 1− η, that is
γEη (k) = max
{
γ : P
[
EEk |PkGk = γ
] ≥ 1− η}
with EEk denoting Eve’s decoding error event on channel k. In Appendix D we derive a lower
bound on the value of γEη (k) which permits us to estimate the best performance achievable by
Eve. From the Rayleigh distribution assumption we have
P
[
PkGk > γ
E
η (k)
]
= exp
(
−γ
E
η (k)
PkαE
)
(35)
and hence (34) becomes
pE = 1−
K∏
k=1
[
1− exp
(
−γ
E
η (k)
PkαE
)]
. (36)
October 28, 2014 DRAFT
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 1, NO. 1, JANUARY 2025 17
By exploiting these expressions, and the knowledge of the transmission (and reception) technique,
we can compute γ¯Emax for which condition (25b) is satisfied for a given power allocation.
Computation of γ¯Emax for CAS: When CAS is implemented, no closed form expression exists
for Eve’s CER; hence we resort to a lower bound. In particular, since the CER is a non-increasing
function of the SNR on each channel, we have
P
[
EE|P1G1 = γ1, . . . , PKGK = γK
] ≥
P
[
EE|P1G1 = γM , . . . , PKGK = γM
] (37)
where M = argmaxk γk is the index of the channel with maximum SNR. Hence, a sufficient
condition for (25b) is that maxk PkGk ≤ mink γEη (k), thus we have
P
[
pE < 1− η] ≤ P [max
k
{PkGk} > min
k
γEη (k)
]
(38)
and we can replace (32) with
γ¯Emax =
1
K
∑
k
Pk max{αE :
P
[
max
k
{PkGk} > min
k
γEη (k)
]
≤ ε} .
(39)
The probability on the r.h.s. of (38) can be calculated as
P
[
max
k
{PkGk} > min
k
γEη (k)
]
=
P
[
K⋃
k=1
{PkGk > min
k
γEη (k)}
]
=
1−
K∏
k=1
[
1− exp
(
−mink γ
E
η (k)
PkαE
)]
.
(40)
Therefore, we obtain an expression similar to (36), though in this case it results from the use
of the lower bound (37), while in the CPS case it is given by an exact derivation. For the special
case in which γEη (1) = γEη (2) = . . . = γEη (K) = γEη , these two expressions coincide; so, we can
use the same formula to model both the CPS and CAS scenarios.
Computation of γBδ : In order to model Bob’s channels, which are supposed to be known,
we only need to compute γBδ , that is, the threshold value of the channel gains which allows
constraints (28) to be satisfied.
In this part of the analysis, we refer to ML decoding also for Bob, and use the well-known
union bound to obtain an upper bound on pB. In fact, in the high SNR region, the union bound is
known to provide a tight approximation of the performance of ML and ML-like decoders [25].
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Let us consider a linear block code with codeword length N , and let dmin denote the code
minimum distance and Aw the number of codewords with weight w. If we focus on a single
channel with SNR γ, we have the following bound on the CER
pB ≤
N∑
w=dmin
AwQ
(√
2γw
)
, (41)
where Q(x) = 1√
2π
∫∞
x
e−t
2/2dt is the complementary CDF of the zero-mean, unit-variance
Gaussian distribution. By considering only the minimum weight codewords, we get the following
approximation
pB ≃ AdminQ
(√
2γdmin
)
, (42)
that provides a very good estimate of ML (or ML-like) decoding performance for large values
of γ, i.e., small values of CER, that are those of interest for Bob. By using the parameters of
the code used in the k-th channel, and by equating the r.h.s. of (42) to δ and solving for γ, we
obtain γBδ (k) under ML decoding, as defined in (29). Concerning the CAS scenario, according
to (30), we have γBδ = maxk γBδ (k).
D. Power Allocation
Let us consider fixed secrecy rate transmissions, regardless of the channel state. On the other
hand, by varying the power allocation we can alter the decoding reliability at Bob and Eve.
Hence, in a parallel to the security rate regions, we see that conditions (25) define regions for
power allocation strategies that ensure reliable and secure communications.
In order to satisfy Bob’s reliability condition (28), Alice transmits at minimum power levels
Pk =
γBδ (k)
Hk
. (43)
More precisely, based on (43), Alice finds the optimal power allocation, and checks whether
the power constraint (2b) is satisfied or not. In the former case, transmission occurs. Otherwise,
Alice skips the transmission, since the reliability target cannot be achieved.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
On the basis of the theoretical analysis developed in the previous sections, we provide here
some examples, under different conditions of the parallel channels. Since the target of our
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analysis is not to find an optimal code/allocation strategy for the CPS and CAS schemes, but
rather to assess and compare the performance achievable by using a practical code in these
configurations, we fix the choice of the code for both CPS and CAS. Moreover, for CPS, full
variable rate coding on each channel could be considered. In this section, however, aiming at
practically feasible and simple systems, we use a linear block code with fixed length and rate
for all channels. As a counterpart, this means that CPS performance could be further improved
by a proper encoder selection over channels with different bit-loading. Under this assumption,
we have γBδ (1) = γBδ (2) = . . . = γBδ (K) = γBδ and γEη (1) = γEη (2) = . . . = γEη (K) = γEη .
For both CPS and CAS, we suppose to use binary phase shift keying (BPSK) and a linear
block code with length N = 128 bits and rate Rc = 1/2. We focus on a (128, 64) extended
BCH (eBCH) code with minimum distance dmin = 22. It must be noted that, contrary to the
approaches searching for secrecy capacity achieving codes [9], [10], in our analysis the code
parameters (rate and length) are fixed.
The eBCH code, in particular, is good for the chosen length, since soft-decision algorithms
can be used for decoding, achieving performance close to that of state-of-the-art LDPC codes.
In these conditions, it is realistic to assume that Bob and Eve use the same decoder, and this
contributes to keeping the security gap small. On the other hand, ML-like decoding becomes
intractable for longer codes, while long LDPC codes with soft-decision iterative decoding achieve
good performance with limited complexity. The choice of LDPC codes allows Bob to work at
a lower SNR, but the gap to the theoretical limits increases. Hence, since we assume that Eve
is always able to use the best decoder, the security gap by using long LDPC codes becomes
larger than for the case of short eBCH codes with ML-like decoding. On the other hand, if
we relax this hypothesis, and consider that Eve uses a practical decoder, the resulting security
gap becomes smaller. For example, by using long LDPC codes and iterative belief propagation
decoding for both Bob and Eve, a security gap reduction of several dBs would result with respect
to the case of short eBCH codes with ML-like decoding.
A. Coding per Sub-message
1) Security gap and equivocation rate with eBCH coding: The achievable performance for
N = 128 and rate Rc = 1/2 is shown in Fig. 3, in terms of CER over a single static channel
with AWGN, as a function of the channel SNR γ. The union bound, computed through (41),
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Fig. 3. CER simulated values and bounds for codes with length N = 128 and rate Rc = 1/2 over a single static channel with
SNR γ.
and the Shannon’s sphere packing bound (SPB), computed as described in Appendix D, are also
shown for the sake of comparison. The performance of the eBCH code under ML decoding is
obtained as in [26]. From the figure we observe that the ML decoding performance is tightly
upper bounded by the union bound in the high SNR region, and tightly lower bounded by
Shannon’s SPB in the low SNR region. This confirms that the two bounds are well suited to
model the performance achievable on each channel by Bob and Eve, respectively. We also report,
for the sake of comparison, the performance achieved by using other decoders. Soft-decision
decoding of the eBCH code has been implemented by following the approach proposed in [27],
while hard-decision decoding of the same code has been simply estimated by using the closed
form expression for bounded distance decoders [28]. We have also included the performance of
an LDPC code, with the same length and rate, designed through the progressive edge growth
algorithm [29], and decoded through the logarithmic version of the sum-product algorithm [30].
Shannon’s SPB provides a lower bound for all the considered schemes, so it actually represents
a reliable and conservative tool for modeling Eve’s performance. Instead, when Bob uses other
decoders than ML, his performance can be far worse than the union bound. In this case, the
security gap must be increased by a suitable margin, which depends on the specific decoding
algorithm used by Bob. By focusing on ML decoding for both Bob and Eve, and using the upper
October 28, 2014 DRAFT
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 1, NO. 1, JANUARY 2025 21
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
  = 4
  = 8
  = 16
  = 32
CD
F
Security gap [dB]
K
K
K
K
Fig. 4. Distribution of the security gap with K = 4, 8, 16, 32 parallel channels. Bob’s channels are known and Alice adopts
optimal power allocation.
TABLE I
SECURITY GAP Sε FOR A (128, 64) EBCH CODED TRANSMISSION WITH CPS OVER K PARALLEL CHANNELS, WITH OUTAGE
PROBABILITY ε = 10−2 . CASE OF EQUAL BOB’S CHANNEL GAINS.
K 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128
γ¯Emax −11.43 dB −12.04 dB −12.57 dB −13.05 dB −13.48 dB −13.87 dB −14.22 dB −14.56 dB
Sε 12.23 dB 12.84 dB 13.37 dB 13.85 dB 14.28 dB 14.67 dB 15.02 dB 15.36 dB
and lower bounds, we can estimate γBδ and γEη . For example, if δ = 10−6 and η = 0.1, we have
γBδ = 0.8 dB and γEη = −4.8 dB.
If we consider that Bob’s channels are known, we can use the approach in Section IV-D and
assume that Alice chooses the optimal power allocation strategy as given by (43), checking that
the power constraint (2b) is verified. Considering CPS, using (36) and imposing ε = 10−2, we
find the maximum value of αE, as defined in Section II, from which γ¯Emax is obtained, according
to (32). We have simulated 10000 realizations of Bob’s channels, with K = 4, 8, 16, 32, and a
maximum average power transmitted by Alice equal to Pmax = γBδ /αB. The resulting CDF of
the security gap is shown in Fig. 4. The average security gap, in these four cases, is 14.68 dB,
15.84 dB, 16.94 dB and 17.93 dB for K = 4, 8, 16 and 32, respectively.
For the sake of comparison, we can consider an ideal scenario, in which all Bob’s channel
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gains are equal and coincide with their mean, Hk = αB, k = 1, . . . , K. In this case, we have
Pk = Pmax, ∀k. This benchmark scenario is considered in Table I, where we report the values
of γ¯Emax and Sε for different values of K. We observe that, in this case, the security gap is lower
than the average security gap for the case with Rayleigh distributed Bob’s channels, which has
been reported, for K = 4, 8, 16 and 32, at the end of the previous paragraph.
We compute the equivocation rate by following the derivation reported in Section IV-A. For
the sake of simplicity, we consider again the case Hk = αB, k = 1, . . . , K, yielding that uniform
power allocation is the optimal solution and we have PkHk = γB, PkαE = γ¯E = γB/Sε. We
also suppose that the minimum transmission power (43) is used to achieve the reliability target
(28). Under these hypotheses, the constellation constrained secrecy rate becomes
C(ε)s = C(γ
B
δ )− C
(
−γ¯E ln ε
K
)
, (44)
while the equivocation rate considering a code with rate Rc is
R(ε)e = Rc − C
(−γ¯E ln (1− (1− ε)1/K)) , (45)
where C(γ) is given by
C(γ) = 1− 1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
(y−√γ)2
2 log(1 + e−2y
√
γ)dy. (46)
By using these expressions, we have computed R(ε)e and C(ε)s , as functions of γ¯E, for γB =
γBδ = 0.8 dB, ε = 0.01, Rc = 1/2 and some values of K. Results are reported in Fig. 5. As
expected, we observe that, for decreasing values of γ¯E, the ε-outage equivocation rate approaches
the BPSK-constrained secrecy rate, and the dependence on K vanishes.
2) Secrecy rate with K = 2 parallel channels: In this example, we consider a simple case
in which the secret message is transmitted over two channels only (i.e., K = 2) and the secrecy
outage probability is constrained below the threshold ε = 0.01.
We report the secrecy rates that are obtained by the optimal solution as described in (14) as
well as the secrecy rates achieved by two suboptimal methods. These are obtained by fixing the
power allocation, in one case to an equal power distribution between the two channels, in the
other by waterfilling on the legitimate receiver channels. The secrecy rates are then optimized
under the given power allocation and the constraint on the secrecy outage probability.
Fig. 6 shows the contour lines of the secrecy rates obtained with the different power allocations
described above, as a function of the power gains of Bob’s channels. The eavesdropper average
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Fig. 6. Contour plot of the achievable secrecy rates with with CPS under optimal (solid), waterfilling (dashed), and equal
(dotted) power allocation, for different values of Bob’s channel gains. In all plots, ε = 0.01, and αEPmax = 0.05.
power gain is such that αEPmax = 0.05 for each channel. As expected from the symmetry of
the problem, the three strategies provide similar performance when H1 and H2 are close to
each other, as all three methods equally divide the power between the two channels. On the
other hand, when H1 and H2 are very different, the optimal solution is to load all power on the
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Fig. 7. (a) Achievable secrecy rates with CPS and (b) fraction P1/(2Pmax) of the available power that is allocated to k = 1.
In all plots, ε = 0.01, αEPmax = 0.05 and H2Pmax = 2 dB.
stronger channel while waterfilling is suboptimal, and equal power allocation achieves a much
lower rate. Waterfilling loses against the optimal solution in the intermediate region, as it is
possible to observe from Fig. 7(a), in which the secrecy rates are shown for a specific value of
Bob’s gain in the second channel, i.e., H2Pmax = 2 dB. The loss can also be seen (although it is
not shown here) to be increasing with the values of αE, since as αE decreases the constraint on
secrecy becomes less stringent than that on reliability, and waterfilling becomes more effective.
This effect is explained by observing that waterfilling allocates power to a channel when its
gain is above a certain threshold to guarantee a benefit in terms of transmission rate without
secrecy constraints. However, when a constraint is imposed on the secrecy outage probability, this
threshold increases. This is also observed in Fig. 7(b), in which the fraction of power allocated
to the first channel by the two non-uniform methods is reported. We see that, when H1 is small,
the optimal power allocation provides the first channel with a lower fraction of power compared
to waterfilling. In particular, in order to allocate power to the first channel, the optimal joint
rate/power allocation method requires a significantly higher average received power than that
required by the waterfilling solution.
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Fig. 8. Contour plot of the achievable secrecy rates with with CAS under optimal (solid), waterfilling (dashed), and equal
(dotted) power allocation, for different values of Bob’s channel gains. In all plots, ε = 0.01, and αEPmax = 0.05.
B. Coding Across Sub-messages
1) Security gap with eBCH coding: Let us consider the case of K = 128 parallel channels
and the same code used in Section V-A, having N = 128 and rate Rc = 1/2. The value of γ¯Emax
can be estimated through (39), which provides the same result already computed for this code
with CPS over K = 128 parallel channels, due to the use of the lower bound (37). Therefore,
by considering ε = 10−2, we obtain Sε = 15.36 dB, as reported in Table I.
When Bob’s channel is also known only in statistical terms, we can use the approach described
in Appendix C to estimate the security gap. This way, and by using the upper bound (62) for
estimating γ¯Bmin, we obtain that the system requires a security gap equal to 56.41 dB, which
is the same as with CPS and K = 128. Nevertheless, we can avoid to use the bound (62)
by exploiting, for the case of CAS, the per-realization method described in [31]. This way,
as detailed in Appendix C, we obtain a security gap equal to 18.21 dB, which highlights the
superiority of CAS over CPS in these conditions.
2) Secrecy rate with K = 2 parallel channels: In this example, we assess the secrecy rate
of the CAS scheme and compare it with the corresponding secrecy rate achieved by CPS for
the simple case of K = 2 parallel channels. Fig. 8 shows the contour lines of the secrecy rate
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Fig. 9. (a) Achievable secrecy rates with CAS and (b) fraction P1/(2Pmax) of the available power that is allocated to k = 1.
In all plots, ε = 0.01, αEPmax = 0.05 and H2Pmax = 2 dB.
(19) obtained within the same two-channel scenario and for the three power allocation strategies
considered in Section V-A. Due to its increased flexibility, we expect that CAS outperforms CPS
when achievable rates are considered. Indeed, this is confirmed by comparing Fig. 8 with Fig. 6.
Still, note that their performances in the considered simulation scenario are quite close, so that
other implementation issues may guide the choice between the two schemes. For example, CAS
is more robust against imperfect power allocation, as we note that the loss incurred by equal
power allocation and waterfilling with respect to the optimal solution is almost negligible for a
wide range of channel gains (as can be also observed in Fig. 8). However, other issues may be
relevant for a complete comparison, as those mentioned at the end of Section II. On the other
hand, Fig. 9(b) shows that, opposite to CPS, when H1 is small, the optimal power allocation for
CAS provides the first channel with a higher fraction of power compared to waterfilling.
3) Channel selection and uniform power allocation: As a more practical example of the use
of CAS, we have also considered the case of K = 48 channels. Since the computation of the
optimal power allocation in this case is infeasible, we have considered a suboptimal approach, in
which only a subset of K ′ ≤ K channels (those with the highest Hk) are used and the available
power is allocated uniformly among them. By imposing an outage probability ε = 0.01, and
considering Pmax = 3.8 dB and αB = 1, Fig. 10(a) shows the maximum (over all values of
K ′ ≤ K) mean outage secrecy rate Rs = 1K
∑
k Rk as a function of αE. As expected, from the
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Fig. 10. Outage secrecy rates with selection of K′ ≤ K = 48 sub-messages and uniform power allocation among them: (a)
mean ε-outage secrecy rate and (b) CDF of secrecy rates due to the statistics of Bob’s channel gains around αB.
figure we observe that, as αE increases, the mean outage secrecy rate decreases. This behavior
is confirmed by Fig. 10(b), that shows CDFs of the outage secrecy rates due to the statistics of
Bob’s channel, for different values of αE.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have characterized the performance of secret transmissions over parallel
channels, under the assumption of knowing the Alice-Bob channel and having only a statistical
description of the Alice-Eve channel. We have used a set of metrics that allow studying the
problem both from the theoretical standpoint and by considering practical coded transmission
schemes. We have derived bounds on the achievable outage secrecy rates (using ideal codes),
and studied the effect of power allocation on the secrecy performance. The definitions of security
gap and equivocation rate have been extended to this scenario, and we have used them to assess
the requirements for achieving security when practical codes are adopted.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
From (11) we have
1 +HkPk
Pk2Rk
− 1
Pk
= −αE ln p¯k (47)
October 28, 2014 DRAFT
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 1, NO. 1, JANUARY 2025 28
which can be rewritten as
2Rk =
1 +HkPk
u¯kPk + 1
. (48)
From (48) we immediately obtain the second result of the theorem.
By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, problem (3) subject to power constraint (2b)
can be written as
max
P ,ν
K∑
k=1
[
log
1 +HkPk
u¯kPk + 1
− ν(Pk − Pmax)
]
. (49)
Setting to zero the derivative with respect to Pk we obtain
u¯kPk + 1
1 +HkPk
[
Hk
u¯kPk + 1
− u¯k(1 +HkPk)
(u¯kPk + 1)2
]
− ν = 0 (50)
which can be rewritten as
u¯kνHkP
2
k + ν(u¯k +Hk)Pk + ν −Hk + u¯k = 0. (51)
Now, from (51), if ν −Hk + u¯k < 0 we obtain (12).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF (17)
From (4) and (15) we can rewrite ps(P , R;H) as
ps(P , R;H) =P
[
K∏
k=1
(1 +GkPk) ≥ Φ(P , R;H)
]
. (52)
Defining β =
∏K
k=1(1 +GkPk) we have
ps(P , R;H) = 1−
∫ Φ(P ,R;H)
1
pβ(a)da (53)
with pβ(a) the PDF of β, which has been computed in [32]. We recall the definition of the
generalized Fox H-function [32]
Hm,np,q
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣ {ai, ci, Ai}{bj , dj, Bj}
 =
1
2pii
∮
C
Mm,np,q
s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ {ai, ci, Ai}{bj , dj, Bj}
 r−sds ,
(54)
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where C is a contour in the complex plane from ω − i∞ to ω + i∞ (where i is the imaginary
unit) such that (bi + k)/di and (ai− 1− k)/ci (with k non-negative integer) lie to the right and
left of C, respectively, and
Mm,np,q
s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ {ai, ci, Ai}{bj , dj, Bj}
 =
∏m
j=1 Γˆ(bj + djs, Bj)
∏n
i=1 Γˆ(1− ai − cis, Ai)∏p
i=n+1 Γˆ(ai + cis, Ai)
∏q
j=m+1 Γˆ(1− bj − djs, Bj)
(55)
is the Mellin transform of the generalized Fox H-function, where Γˆ(·, ·) is the upper incomplete
Gamma function
Γˆ(s, a) =
∫ ∞
a
ts−1e−tdt , (56)
and an empty product is taken to be one. We have [32]
pβ(a) =
ε(P )
ϕ(P )
HK,00,K
 a
ϕ(P )
∣∣∣∣ {−,−,−}{0, 1, (PkαE)−1}k=1,...,K
 ,
for a ≥ 1 and pβ(a) = 0 otherwise. The notation {−,−,−} means that the coefficients are
absent. Now, by observing that∫ q
1
t−sdt =
q1−s − 1
1− s = (q
1−s − 1)Γˆ(1− s, 0)
Γˆ(2− s, 0) (57)
and inserting the integral of (53) into (54) and using (57) together with (55) we obtain (17).
APPENDIX C
SECURITY GAP FOR BOB’S CHANNEL KNOWN ONLY IN STATISTICAL TERMS
When Bob’s channels are known only in statistical terms, we consider an outage approach also
for Bob in order to define the security gap. In fact, pB is a random variable, whose distribution
is uniquely determined by the average SNR. The average SNR of the Alice-Bob channel is
γ¯B =
1
K
∑
k
αBPk, (58)
under the assumption of i.i.d. Rayleigh channels.
We are interested in finding the minimum value of γ¯B, denoted as γ¯Bmin, for which the
probability that (28) does not hold is not greater than ω, i.e., for CPS
γ¯Bmin =
1
K
∑
k
Pk min{αB : P
[∪Kk=1{pBk > δ}] ≤ ω} (59a)
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and for CAS
γ¯Bmin =
1
K
∑
k
Pk min{αB : P
[
pB > δ
] ≤ ω} , (59b)
where pBk is Bob’s CER on each channel. Then the (ω, ε) security gap in this case is defined as
Sω,ε =
γ¯Bmin
γ¯Emax
, (60)
where γ¯Emax is given by (32). The value of γ¯Bmin is computed next for CPS and CAS.
Computation of γ¯Bmin for CPS: When CPS is considered, we must impose that pBk ≤ δ.
Therefore, Bob’s outage probability is
P
[∪Kk=1{pBk > δ}] = 1− K∏
k=1
(
1− P [pBk > δ]) =
1−
K∏
k=1
(1− P [PkHk < γBδ (k)]) .
(61)
From the Rayleigh distribution assumption, we have P
[
PkHk < γ
B
δ (k)
]
= 1 − exp
(
−γBδ (k)
PkαB
)
,
and by equating the r.h.s. of (61) to ω, we can derive the value of αB and the corresponding
γ¯Bmin.
By using the same assumptions as in Section V, i.e., by considering the use of BPSK and of
the same eBCH code with length N = 128 and rate Rc = 1/2 on all channels, we have computed
γ¯Bmin for the case of CPS. The results, and the corresponding values of Sω,ε obtained by using
the values of γ¯Emax given in Table I, are reported in Table II. As expected, when Bob’s channels
are known only in statistical terms, the values of the security gap needed to ensure conditions
(25) are significantly higher than those for the case in which Bob’s channels are known exactly,
which have been reported in Table I.
TABLE II
SECURITY GAP Sω,ε FOR A (128, 64) EBCH CODED TRANSMISSION WITH CPS OVER K PARALLEL CHANNELS, WITH
OUTAGE PROBABILITIES ω = ε = 10−2 .
K 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128
γ¯Bmin 20.78 dB 23.79dB 26.80 dB 29.81 dB 32.82 dB 35.83 dB 38.84 dB 41.85 dB
Sω,ε 32.21 dB 35.83 dB 39.37 dB 42.86 dB 46.30 dB 49.70 dB 53.06 dB 56.41 dB
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Computation of γ¯Bmin for CAS: Similarly to what has been done for Eve in Section IV-C, for
CAS we are interested in finding a worst-case estimate of Bob’s error probability. As a closed
form expression is not available, we resort to an upper bound. In particular we have
P
[
EB|P1H1 = γ1, . . . , PKHK = γK
] ≤
P
[
EB|P1H1 = γm, . . . , PKHK = γm
] (62)
where m = argmink γk is the index of the channel with the minimum SNR. Hence, a sufficient
condition for (28) is that mink PkHk ≥ maxk γBδ (k), and we can replace (59) with γ¯Bmin =
1
K
∑
k Pk min{αB : P
[
mink{PkHk} < maxk γBδ (k)
] ≤ ω}. Moreover, we have
P
[
min
k
{PkHk} < max
k
γBδ (k)
]
=
P
[
K⋃
k=1
PkHk < max
k
γBδ (k)
]
=
1−
K∏
k=1
(1− P
[
PkHk < max
k
γBδ (k)
]
) .
(63)
So, in the special case in which γBδ (1) = γBδ (2) = . . . = γBδ (K) = γBδ , we obtain again the
same expression for both CPS and CAS scenarios. However, for CPS it provides exact results,
while for CAS it is due to the use of the upper bound (62).
Let us consider an example with K = 128 parallel channels, over which the same (128, 64)
eBCH code considered in Section V is used to implement CAS. In this case, we have γ¯Emax =
−14.56 dB, γ¯Bmin = 41.85 dB and Sω,ε = 56.41 dB, as it results from Tables I and II.
In order to avoid resorting to the upper bound (62) for estimating γ¯Bmin, we can use the per-
realization method described in [31]. This method provides an estimate of the CER achieved
by a given code when each coded bit is transmitted over a channel with a different gain, and
the channel gains are Rayleigh distributed. This situation exactly models the CAS scenario
we consider, and the estimate so found is tight for ML-like decoders and high SNR values,
that matches with Bob’s condition. Therefore, we have applied this method by computing all
the 243840 codewords with weight 22 in the (128, 64) eBCH code, according to [33]. The
results obtained are reported in Fig. 11 in terms of the estimated CER as a function of γ¯B, for
several values of Bob’s outage probability ω. Based on these results, we get that pB ≤ 10−6 for
γ¯B ≥ γ¯Bmin = 3.65 dB and ω = 10−2 . Therefore, a tighter estimate of the security gap in this
case is Sω,ε = 18.21 dB.
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Fig. 11. Upper bound on the CER estimated through the per-realization analysis for the eBCH code with length N = 128,
rate Rc = 1/2 and several values of Bob’s outage ω.
APPENDIX D
ON THE COMPUTATION OF γEη
We assume that Eve uses ML decoding, which represents the most dangerous condition for
the legitimate receiver. In order to assess Eve’s error rate, we use Shannon’s SPB on the error
probability of a coded transmission with ML decoding [34], which is the tightest one for high
error rate values, at which Eve is supposed to operate.
By Shannon’s SPB on the block error probability under ML decoding, the error probability
at Eve’s over a single channel with SNR γ is bounded by [35]
pE(γ) > PSPB(N, ϑ,A), (64)
where PSPB(N, ϑ,A) is the probability that the received vector falls outside the N-dimensional
circular cone of half angle ϑ whose main axis passes through both the origin and the point
corresponding to the transmitted signal [35]. In (64), A = √2Rcγ, where Rc is the code rate.
The tightest lower bound on the error probability is achieved for ϑ1(N,Rcn) such that
ΩN (ϑ1(N,Rcn))
ΩN (pi)
= exp(−NRcn), (65)
where Rcn is the code rate in nats per channel use, ΩN (ϑ) = 2π
(N−1)/2
Γ((N−1)/2)
∫ ϑ
0
(sinϕ)N−2dϕ,
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ΩN (pi) =
2πN/2
Γ(N/2)
, and Γ(·) denotes the Gamma function. From [35] we have
P SPB(N, ϑ,A) =
(N − 1) exp
(
−NA2
2
)
√
2pi
×∫ pi
2
ϑ
(sinϕ)N−2fN
(√
NA cosϕ
)
dϕ +Q
(√
NA
)
,
(66)
where fN (x) =
∑N−1
j=0 exp (d(N, j, x)), with
d(N, j, x) =
x2
2
+ ln Γ
(
N
2
)
− ln Γ
(
j
2
+ 1
)
− ln Γ (N − j) + (N − 1− j) ln
(√
2x
)
− ln 2
2
+ ln
[
1 + (−1)jΓ˜
(
x2
2
,
j + 1
2
)]
, (67)
and Γ˜(·, ·) denoting the lower incomplete Gamma function
Γ˜(x, a) =
1
Γ(a)
∫ x
0
ta−1e−tdt . (68)
This way of computing Shannon’s SPB corresponds to the logarithmic domain approach
proposed in [35], which avoids the numerical over- and under-flows affecting the calculation
of the bound for large block lengths. By considering the parameters of the code used in the k-th
channel, and by solving PSPB(N, ϑ,A) = 1− η with respect to γ, we obtain γEη (k) such that the
error probability on that channel is 1− η.
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